AirDefense Academy · Contents · Chapter 6 · Nederlandse versie

Chapter 6: Doctrine & TTPs

Why the VKS operates as it does: the Soviet roots, the ground-oriented A2/AD role, the officer-led command culture, GCI, and the mathematical decision-making model.

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6.1Doctrinal roots

Current VKS doctrine is directly rooted in Soviet and even tsarist military thinking.

Read §6.1 →

6.2Ground-oriented air force & A2/AD

The VKS exists to support land operations and to deny its own airspace — not to independently win air superiority.

Read §6.2 →

6.3Command-and-control culture

Officer-led, top-down and focused on rapid execution — "drills and skills".

Read §6.3 →

6.4GCI, QRA & pilot employment

Russian fighters fly under tight ground control with short, fixed missions — no room for individual initiative.

Read §6.4 →

6.5Decision-making: DPM & COFM

The Russian planning process is mathematical and formula-based — deliberately different from the NATO staff method.

Read §6.5 →

6.6Strengths & weaknesses — Russian vs. NATO

The contrast between the Russian and the NATO approach to command can be summed up concisely:

Read §6.6 →

6.7Future outlook

The modernisation direction: lessons from the Gulf wars, precision weapons and networked operations.

Read §6.7 →

6.8Lessons from Ukraine (2022–2026)

The war tested the doctrine in practice — and confirmed both its strengths and its weaknesses.

Read §6.8 →

6.9The stand-off strike package: the tactical group (ГТН)

How the Russian General Staff codifies coordinated stand-off operations — a mission package that combines striking, reconnaissance, jamming and protection.

Read §6.9 →

6.10The reconnaissance-strike/fire complex (RUK/ROK)

The underlying loop behind all modern Russian fire: reconnaissance → decision → weapon, coupled as tightly as possible. Drones finally made this Soviet dream workable.

Read §6.10 →

6.11The strategic deep-strike campaign: massed one-way-attack drones

Alongside tactical fire (§6.10) the VKS runs a strategic campaign: waves of cheap Geran drones and cruise missiles against the power grid, C2 and the defence industry deep behind the front.

Read §6.11 →

6.12Long-range air-to-air: the R-37M as 'airborne sniper'

Without forcing air superiority, the VKS still manages to control Ukrainian airspace — with one very-long-range missile that pushes fighters to the deck.

Read §6.12 →