Russia drew lessons from Desert Storm, Kosovo and Iraqi Freedom: the importance of air power, precision weapons and network warfare was reaffirmed. The modernisation direction:
- Need for precision-guided munitions (PGM) and intelligent target systems / C4-ISR.
- An interlinked weapons network — sensor-to-shooter.
- Equipment overhaul: avoiding the Soviet pitfall of large numbers of non-serviceable (U/S) aircraft.
- Upgrading 3rd and 4th generation aircraft; developing the 5th generation (Su-57 / PAK-FA).
- Role as "airborne sniper" — not primarily SEAD/DEAD.
- Reforming the avionics industry and increasing exports to fund development.
The Russian economy has been hit hard by international sanctions. Higher defence allocation to the air force must deliver the doctrinal tasks and implement the Gulf War lessons, but budget, industrial capacity and sanctions keep slowing the modernisation. Stealth (Su-57) is an ambition, not an accomplished fact.
Current priorities: GPV & Belousov's blueprint
Two recent signals show where the money and attention go:
- The State Armament Programme (GPV) for the coming decade centres on three things: strategic nuclear forces, integrated air defence and long-range precision strike — exactly the areas Russia is comfortable in, not manoeuvre air operations.
- Minister Belousov's "blueprint" for the war in Ukraine prioritises drones, electronic warfare, air defence and situational awareness — the institutional soil beneath the new drone forces (BSV) and the counter-UAS layer.
Both documents point the same way: Russia invests in denial and deep strike (AD, precision fire, drones, nuclear) rather than a Western-style manoeuvre air force. The modernisation confirms the doctrine (§ 6.2) rather than revising it.
Northern Defence Affairs (Russia's State Armament Programme; Belousov's Blueprint for Fighting in Ukraine, 2026). Didactic summary.