Since February 2022 the full-scale war in Ukraine has been the sharpest test of VKS doctrine. The picture that emerges confirms the ground-oriented, defensive design — but also exposes deep shortcomings.
What the doctrine confirmed
- No air superiority. The VKS failed to knock out Ukrainian air defence and could not force air dominance — exactly what the "gap filler" role already implied (see § 6.2). Analyses of a hypothetical Baltic scenario reach the same conclusion: NATO would keep aerospace superiority over the Baltic theatre — the VKS lacks the multirole mass, enablers and SEAD/DEAD capacity to overturn that (NDA, Russia Lacks the Air Power to Support a Baltic Invasion, 2026).
- Ground-based centre of gravity. The mutually dense SAM network made the airspace deadly for both sides; manned aircraft stayed largely over own/occupied territory.
- Mass and redundancy. Despite heavy losses the VKS kept operating through numbers and continued production — in line with the quantity philosophy (§ 6.4).
What the war exposed
- Stand-off out of necessity. Because penetration was too costly, the VKS now leans heavily on glide bombs: cheap UMPK/FAB glide-bomb kits (FAB-250 to FAB-3000) released from the Su-34 at 60–90 km — newer jet-powered variants reach further still. This mass, inaccurate but devastating weapon has become the tactical hallmark.
- Vulnerable bases. Deep drone strikes — culminating in Operation Spiderweb (June 2025) — destroyed strategic bombers and A-50s as far as Siberia. Fixed air bases proved a strategic Achilles' heel.
- Scarce enablers. The loss of several A-50 AWACS (see § 2.1) and the lack of tankers and modern ISR severely limit combat control and reach.
- Breaking chain of command. The rigid, top-down C2 culture (§ 6.3) made the forces slow and vulnerable once nodes were hit.
- Stealth still unproven. The Su-57 stayed in a marginal, stand-off role and was itself damaged on the ground.
Synthesis
The war did not change the structure of the doctrine — ground-oriented, defensive, GCI-controlled — but forced the VKS into an attrition war of glide bombs and air defence instead of the manoeuvre air operations Western air forces aim for. The biggest shift is the realisation that the "safe depth" of the Russian interior no longer exists.