Where § 6.8 describes the need for stand-off, an article in Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought — the theoretical journal of the Russian General Staff, 2025) shows how the VKS shapes this operation doctrinally. Its core is the ГТН — the tactical group (gruppa takticheskogo naznacheniya): not a single aircraft but a coordinated package that operates as one, just outside the reach of Ukrainian air defence.
Composition of the ГТН
| Element | Means | Task |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Drones or fighter radar (Su-34 / Su-35S) | Target detection and designation |
| Strike | Bomber / ground-attack / army helicopter | Deliver the actual weapon |
| Jamming (REB) | Mi-8MTPR EW helicopter | Stays on station and covers the package with jamming |
| Rescue (SAR) | Mi-8 helicopters | Recovery of aircrew on loss |
| Airspace control | Su-35S with air-to-air and anti-radar missiles | Escort against fighters and air defence |
Four stand-off techniques
- Glide-bomb attack (UMPK). The Su-34 approaches very low, climbs briefly to release the glide bomb at up to ~90 km, and turns straight away — outside the SAM envelope.
- Drone-designated guided missile. A forward drone provides laser illumination of a fixed target while the launching aircraft withdraws before entering the threat ring.
- Lofted rocket attack. The aircraft approaches low, climbs in a pull-up to "loft" unguided rockets at maximum range, then dives away in a turn. Pairs fly several minutes apart.
- Helicopter strike on columns. Three-helicopter formations fire from a launch line at the predicted position of a moving column — typically 60–90 minutes after setting out.
The Mi-8MTPR provides the organic jamming umbrella. For the last few metres the doctrine introduces Volnorez — a compact EW system that detects an attacking drone and suppresses its control radio link (helicopter variant in trials since August 2024). See the counter-UAS principles in EW Academy § 17.
The doctrine paper does not cover fibre-optic FPV drones — precisely the weapon that, guided by a thin fibre cable, emits no radio signal and is therefore immune to jammers like Volnorez. Four months after publication that vulnerability was exploited in real combat (first confirmed fibre-optic kill March 2026). Here the doctrine lags behind practice — a recurring pattern (see EW § 17.7).
Summarised from an analysis by A. Turunen (Northern Defence Affairs, 2025), based on Afanasyev, Artemyev, Kochnev & Ivanov in Voyennaya Mysl (2025). Didactic summary; figures indicative.