The most important point to understand about the VKS: it is ground-oriented. Russia leans on ground-based control of the battlespace; the air force supports the tactical land plan and is not an independent "air-superiority-first" instrument as Western air forces are.
- The air force supports the ground plan — that is more than just close air support (CAS), but subordinate to the land manoeuvre.
- The air force is part of the A2/AD concept (Anti-Access / Area Denial): fighters act as "gap fillers" and an additional top-cover umbrella above the ground-based air defence.
- The aim is to deny the airspace to the adversary, not to control it over enemy territory.
On paper VKS doctrine does have offensive tasks: contest enemy airspace, conduct offensive actions to establish air dominance. In practice that ambition clashes with limited multirole capability, training and support assets (AAR, AWACS). The result is an air force that operates mainly within its own A2/AD bubble.
The Russian fighter forms an "additional top cover umbrella" above the SAM belts and is meant to counter the NATO AirLand Battle doctrine. The centre of gravity of the air defence stays on the ground (see chapter 5).
Want to see how an adversary tries to break this A2/AD bubble? The Intel Academy has a playable IPB scenario in which, as a NATO analyst, you analyse the layered air defence of a fictional exclave and plan a SEAD/DEAD breakthrough — the mirror image of this doctrine.