AirDefense Academy · Contents · Chapter 4 · §4.7 · Nederlandse versie

§4.7 LRA — Long-Range Aviation

The strategic bomber fleet: the air component of the nuclear triad plus conventional deep strike.

Open §4.7 in the academy

The Long-Range Aviation (LRA, organised as the 37th Air Army) stands apart from the tactical AFADA and is centrally controlled. It forms the air leg of the nuclear triad and at the same time provides conventional stand-off strike power with cruise missiles (Kh-101/102). The bombers fly from a handful of large bases deep in the interior.

BaseUnitAircraft
Engels-222nd Guards Heavy Bomber DivisionTu-160, Tu-95MS
ShaikovkaAGp 6950th AFBTu-22M3 (± 48)
Olenegorsk (Olenya)6952th AF BaseTu-22M3
Belaya (Srednyy, Irkutsk)Heavy Bomber Division (det.)Tu-22M3, Tu-95
Ukrainka (Seryshevo)Heavy Bomber Division (East)Tu-95MS (± 36)
Remember

The LRA operates on the concept of the "launch box": bombers launch their cruise missiles far outside the reach of enemy air defence. The threat lies not in the aircraft itself but in the cruise missiles with a range of 2,500+ km. See the threat cards for Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M3.

Operation Spiderweb — 1 June 2025

The LRA seemed untouchable deep in the interior — until Ukraine struck on 1 June 2025 with Operation Spiderweb ("Pavutyna"). The intelligence service SBU smuggled ± 117 small FPV drones in trucks deep into Russian territory and launched them right next to the bases — an attack that undid strategic depth as a defence.

BaseResult (open source / satellite)
Belaya (Irkutsk, Siberia)± 3 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 destroyed — first strike in Siberia
Olenya (Murmansk)± 4 Tu-95 and 1 An-12 destroyed
Ivanovo Severny2 A-50 AWACS hit
Dyagilevo / UkrainkaAttack failed or no hits
Strategic impact

Independent estimates (e.g. IISS) put it at ± 12 aircraft destroyed — around 20% of the serviceable strategic bomber fleet. These aircraft are no longer produced and are virtually irreplaceable. As a result Russia dispersed and relocated bombers (among others to the Far East), built shelters and even painted aircraft silhouettes on aprons as decoys. The attack showed the vulnerability of fixed air bases as a core weakness of the VKS (see § 6.8).