The four branches are each worthless without the others: radar without a missile is blind firing, a missile without radar is deaf. The Russian air defence ties them together via a hierarchy of command posts and, since the 2010s, a new generation of automated combat-control systems (ASU) that share the air picture and assign targets to fire units automatically.
The command hierarchy
| Echelon | Command post / system | Function |
|---|---|---|
| Strategic | Central VKS command post / NTsUO (Moscow) | National air picture, priorities, missile defence |
| Operational (AFADA) | Air-defence division → ADOC | Coordination between sectors within the district |
| Sector | SOC / Baikal-1ME | Higher ASU node; directs several brigades |
| Brigade / regiment | Polyana-D4M1 | ASU for the SAM brigade; distributes targets across battalions |
| RTV regiment | Fundament-M | Collects and processes radar data, feeds the command posts |
| EW brigade | Bylina (RB-109A) | Automated control of EW assets |
The common thread: Fundament bundles the RTV radar picture and sends it to Baikal-1ME (sector) and Polyana-D4M1 (brigade). Those ASUs fuse the tracks, set priority and assign each target to the most suitable fire unit — an S-400 battalion, a Pantsir or an interception fighter. Bylina meanwhile directs the EW assets that disrupt the attacker and shield the own sites.
The greatest strength and vulnerability lies in this command. If the chain works, radar, missile and fighter fire as one fist. If a node fails (SOC, Polyana, a key radar), the branches fall back on autonomous operation with far less range and effectiveness. That is why SEAD/DEAD targets the C2 nodes, not just the launchers.