Where §5.12 closes the bottom gap (drones), the top of the IADS holds a separate, strategic layer: the anti-ballistic and anti-hypersonic defence. It protects not against fighters but against ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide weapons and near-space objects — and is largely separate from regular air defence.
| System | Role | Range / altitude |
|---|---|---|
| S-500 Prometheus (threat card) | Strategic anti-ballistic, anti-hypersonic, near-space | up to ~180–200 km altitude; first regiment late 2025 |
| S-400 / S-300V4 | Limited anti-TBM within area defence | against tactical ballistic missiles |
| A-135 / A-235 (Nudol) | Strategic missile defence around Moscow; A-235 also anti-satellite (ASAT) | endo- and exo-atmospheric; Don-2N radar |
A ballistic or hypersonic threat comes from above and at extreme speed — a very different interception problem than a low-flying aircraft. The chain leans heavily on the early-warning radars (SPRN, Voronezh): they detect a launch thousands of km out and give the strategic defence the precious minutes it needs. The A-135/A-235 around Moscow is also partly nuclear-armed legacy — a fundamentally different logic than the conventional S-400.
Hypersonic glide weapons fly manoeuvring and at intermediate altitudes for which neither the classic SAMs nor the exo-atmospheric ABMs are well built — precisely the "seam" between the layers. The S-500 is Russia's answer to close that seam; whether it delivers is still largely a claim. The same challenge applies in reverse: Russian hypersonic weapons (Kinzhal, Tsirkon) exploit exactly that gap in Western defence.
Open-source system references (Missile Threat/CSIS, IISS) and Russian publications. Didactic summary; near-space figures are claims, indicative.