The classic IADS (§ 5.1) has a structural gap: an S-400 worth millions is economically useless against a few-hundred-euro FPV drone, and small drones also fly below the radar horizon of the large systems. The war forced Russia into its own bottom counter-UAS layer (C-UAS) — the defensive mirror of the attacker techniques on the EW Academy.
The layered counter-drone approach
| Layer | Means | Against |
|---|---|---|
| Electronic (REB) | RB-341V Leer-3, Zhitel (R-330Zh), Pole-21, Volnorez | The C2/video link of RF-controlled drones (§ 5.9) |
| Gun / kinetic short | Pantsir-S1 (gun mode), ZU-23, Derivatsiya-PVO (57 mm) | Drones within visual/short range |
| Point-defence SAM | Tor-M2, Pantsir (missile) | Larger UAVs, loitering munitions, cruise missiles |
| Passive / physical | Nets, "cope cages", camouflage, mobile hunter teams | FPV impact on fixed positions and vehicles |
Counter-drone has been promoted from a side task to a core mission. In the new drone forces (BSV) each drone regiment gets an organic counter-drone battalion, and Russian development plans aim for a 2.7-fold expansion of counter-drone assets in 2025–26. It is no longer an "extra" duty of regular air defence but a service arm in the making.
The whole electronic layer — Leer-3 to Volnorez — works against drones that use a radio link. The fibre-optic FPV drone is steered through a thin glass-fibre cable and emits nothing; jamming has no purchase on it (see § 6.9 and EW § 17.7). Against it only the kinetic and physical layers remain — exactly the gap the doctrine has not yet closed.
Summarised from open C-UAS overviews and Russian development roadmaps (incl. Voyennaya Mysl themes). Didactic summary; figures indicative.