Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 the VKS has been operating in a sustained high-intensity conflict. That has overtaken the picture from the older literature on several points. The common thread: the VKS has never achieved air superiority over Ukraine and has fallen back on operating within its own A2/AD bubble — exactly what the doctrine already predicted (see § 6.2).
| Development | Essence |
|---|---|
| No air superiority | Ukrainian air defence stayed intact; the VKS operates mostly over its own/occupied territory. |
| Stand-off with glide bombs | Mass use of UMPK/FAB glide bombs from the Su-34 — now the dominant VKS weapon (see § 6.8). |
| Heavy losses | Over 350 aircraft visually confirmed lost (open source, Oryx) since Feb 2022 — fighters, bombers, A-50s, helicopters. |
| Vulnerable bases | Ukrainian deep drone strikes hit air bases as far as Siberia — culminating in Operation Spiderweb (June 2025). |
| 2024 reorganisation | Split of the Western MD into a Leningrad and a Moscow MD (see § 3.1). |
Common thread
The war confirmed the ground-oriented, defensive character of the VKS and at the same time exposed its weaknesses: lack of SEAD/DEAD capability, limited precision stand-off weapons early on, and great vulnerability of fixed air bases. The lessons learned are in § 6.8.